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Witkacy’s Pure Form 
and the Concept of the Sublime
... The relation of art to an audience understood to 
be passive, inert, surfeited, can only be assault. Art 
becomes identical with aggression.
S. Sontag, Styles o f Radical Will
Without an element of cruelty at the root of every 
spectacle, the theatre is not possible...
... If the theatre i s ... bloody and inhuman, it i s ... to 
manifest and unforgettably root within us the idea of 
a perpetual conflict, a  spasm in which life is continually 
lacerated ...
A. Arland, The Theatre o f Cruelty 
First Manifesto
We must unleash the slumbering Beast and see what 
it can do. And if it runs mad, there will be always time 
enough to shoot it
S. I. Wilkiewicz, On a New Type o f Play
Theatre in Pure Form, whose artistic potential Witkacy compares to the 
latent force of the slumbering beast, was proclaimed by his contemporaries, 
almost in unison, an apology of nonsense or, at best, an implicit parody of 
some modes of thinking1. However, in the course of its reception Witkacy’s 
idea of Pure Form in theatre has become a dynamic link in the network of 
post-war avant-garde. It can be related there to the Theatre of the Absurd, the 
Theatre of Cruelty, Craig’s wholistic concept of mise-en-scene, to name but 
a few.
1 Cf. S.I. Witkiewicz, Czysta forma w teatrze (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Artystyczne i Filmo­
we, 1986), pp. 6—8.
In view of the fact that Witkacy himself found only four of his plays the 
most complete, still not utterly satisfying, realisations of Pure Form in theatre,2 
Witkacy’s idea can be considered primarily as a point of direction, an ideal the 
movement towards which is a value in itself and whose various aspects still can 
be actualised.
What is to be focused on in our presentation of Pure Form is its relation to the 
concept of the sublime. We want (1) to show theatre in Pure Form as productive of 
what Burke calls “the strongest emotion of the mind”, Le. the feeling of the 
sublime3 and (2) to consider the process of “sublimation” of the theatrical 
performance due to which it can be viewed as an instance of Pure Form.
In chemical terminology “to sublimate” means “to convert from a solid 
state to vapour by heat and allow to solidify again (in order to p u r i fy  it)”4 
and “sublimate” substance is “refined” substance that is “free from other 
substances, made p u re ” 5.
The use of chemical terminology is not based on the similarity of the 
word-forms constituted by the same root (“sublim-e” and “sublim-ation”) and 
possibly chance convergence of the terms in the dictionary definitions (to 
sublimate — to purify; sublimate (substance) — pure (substance)). The fact is 
that the chemical process of sublimation can be viewed as a sort of metaphor 
for the constitutive processes of the theatrical performance in Pure Form.
The two directions of our presentation reflect, in fact, the co-existence of the 
terms “esthetic” and “artistic”, conventionally referred to the act of perception 
and creation respectively. The separate uses of the two terms, when a work of 
art is viewed not as a ready-made object, but a product of the act of 
perception6, can point to “the absence of the adequate term designating the 
two processes taken together” 7; on the other hand, that can be a conscious 
move intended to emphasise two modes of existence of a work of art: the effect 
it evokes in the perceiver (the esthetic aspect) and the way it is constituted in 
the act of perception (the artistic aspect). Thus, in our presentation, both the 
esthetic and artistic belong to the art of creation in  perception.
The main body of the paper delineated above is followed by a sort of 
afterthought on the possible overlapping of Pure Form and the concept of the 
sublime in relation to Peirce’s category of Firstness.
2 Cf. D. C. Gerould, The Madman and Other Plays by Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz (Seattle and 
London: University of Washington Press, 1973), pp. 299—300.
3 Cf. E. Burke, A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin o f Our Ideas o f the Sublime and the 
Beautiful (London: 1812), p. 58.
* Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English [emphasis added].
5 Ibid. [emphasis added].
6C£ K. Rosner, “Udział semiotyki dwudziestowiecznej w przemianie paradygmatu pojęć 
estetycznych”, Studia Semiotyczne, vol. XIV—XV (Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1986), 
pp. 335, 337, 339.
7Cf. J. Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Capricorn Books, 1934), p. 46.
IBurke calls pain and pleasure positive feelings, which means they are not 
dependant on each other for their existence. He denies that pain arises from the 
removal of some pleasure and points to a state of indifference as the neutral sphere 
between the two extremes8. He distinguishes at the same time pleasure that cannot 
exist without a relation to pain and uses “the term d e l i g h t  to express the 
sensation which accompanies the removal of pain or danger”9. Whatever excites 
delight is a source of the sublime — “it is productive of the strongest emotion that 
the mind is capable of feeling”10. However, Burke states also that whatever excites 
the id e a  of pain and danger is a source of the sublime11 and “terror is 
a passion which always produces delight when it does not press to o  c lo se” 12. 
Pain and pleasure, and any modifications of those have as their source the 
ideas possibly reduced to two heads: self-preservation and society. It is the 
passions which concern self-preservation, which are conversant about the 
preservation of the individual, that turn chiefly on pain or danger13.
In view of Dewey’s presentation of life-sustaining mechanisms the theatrical 
performance in Pure Form can be shown as exciting the id e a  of threat to man’s 
instinct of self-preservation, and as such, productive of the feeling of the sublime.
As Dewey delineates it the living creature remains in constant interaction with 
its environment Life continues and expands overcoming factors of opposition and 
conflict Equilibrium is reached out of, and because of, tension. The rhythm of life 
is the rhythm of loss of integration with environment and recovery of union. The 
moments of loss of integration are not holes, but places of rest pauses, which are 
ultimately overcome14. However, the pause when prolonged beyond the safe point 
at which the recovery of union is still possible, spells death, the ultimate, 
irreversible break. The time of approaching that point is the time of growing 
tension that becomes, however, a part of conscious experience only when it is 
overcome. You cannot experience nothingness, you can only have an idea of it  
The phases of loss of integration are present to the consciousness only as ideas of 
danger, since the moment they are realized the danger is overcome. The fact that 
the moments which, when prolonged, spell death are inherent'to the rhythm of life 
as a whole can point to Dewey’s opposition of pleasure and delight as similar 
conceptually to that formulated by Burke. Dewey distinguishes p l e a s u r e  that 
may come about by chance contact and d e l ig h t  that comes to be through a sort 
of fulfilment, an adjustment of our whole being with the conditions of existence15.
BCf. E. Burke, A Phibsophical Inquiry..., p. 44.
9 Ibid., p. 54.
10 Ibid., p. 58.
11 Cf. ibid.
11 Ibid., p. 73.
13 Cf. ibid., pp. 57, 58.
14 Cf. J. Dewey, Art..., pp. 14— 15.
]S Ibid., p. 17.
The experience of life as such is, then, the experience of ultimate harmony 
“coming” out of successive phases of union and disjunction, the experience of 
unity achieved through interaction of opposed energies, a resultant of suspense 
between reciprocal resistances.
The “theatrical reality” — the possible world of the theatrical performance 
(WTP)16 appears as a Active world due to theatrical and dramatic conventions. 
As Peirce claims “(t)he real world cannot be distinguished from a fictitious 
world by any description ... This exemplifies the neccessity of i n d i c a t i n g  that 
the real world is meant if it be meant ... and this world like a fictitious world 
requires an index to distinguish it” 17.
Witkacy insists that the possible world of the theatrical performance in 
Pure Form (WPF) is to be the world with which “on the realistic level we have 
no contact” 18; the possible world of the theatrical performance in Pure Form 
is the world “free from causality found in real life”; it is “the whole whose 
meaning would ... not be defined by the demands of consistent psychology and 
action according to assumptions from real life”, in which “the fantastic 
psychology of characters ... who are ... completely unlike people in real life 
produce events ... not limited to any logic” 19.
Any kind of reality is constituted by the principles synthesizing its elements. 
Wittgenstein goes as far as to find the very idea of elements existing out of the system 
contradictory; since being as such consists in the r e l a t i o n s  among elements20.
Theatre does not have its own intrinsic, homogeneous elements like the pure 
arts: Painting and Music21. Kowzan specifies thirteen sign-systems operating in 
theatre22. However, “the theatre without the characters who act, no matter how 
outrageously and improbably, is inconceivable”23. The elements of theatre are 
not exclusively simple signs of Kowzan’s typology, but the compounds of grow­
ing complexity that inevitably form the content of human action of which thea­
tre can be independent only in its final result24. However, “reality is more
16 Throughout this paper, for the sake of brievity, the possible world of the theatrical 
performance and the spectator’s actual world are marked (WTP) and (WQ) respectively, cf. K. Elam, 
The Semiotics o f Theatre and Drama (London, New York: Methuen, 1980), p. 103. Consequently, 
the possible world of the theatrical performance in Pure Form is abbreviated (Wpp).
17 Ch. S. Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. I—VI, ed. Hartshome and 
P. Weiss; vols. VII—VIII, ed. W. Burks (Cambridge: Harward University Press, 1931—1958). 
According the the established practice in Peirce’s scholarship, the main body of his published writings 
— Collected Papers, are referred to by volume and paragraph number and abbreviated CP. CP, 2337.
1BS.I. Witkiewicz, Czysta forma..., p. 91; D.C. Gerould, The Madman..., p. 296. While 
quoting Witkacy, we use Daniel Geroulds’s translation of Witkacy’s writings and refer particular 
quotations both to the English translation and the Polish original.
19 Ibid., pp. 77, 78; 292, 293.
20 L. Wittgenstein, Dociekania filozoficzne, trans. B. Wolniewicz (Warszawa: PWN, 1972), p. 40.
11 S.I. Witkiewicz, Czysta forma..., p. 78; D.C. Gerould, The Madman..., p. 293.
22 See K. Elam, The Semiotics..., p. 50.
23S.I. Witkiewicz, Czysta forma..., p. 78; D.C. Gerould, The Madman..., p. 293.
24 Cf. ibid., p. 76; p. 292.
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than the matter of discrete events occurring at given points in space-time. 
Reality is a matter of relations between them”25. Therefore, it is not the mere 
presence of the stage of fantastic element that makes “the contact on the 
realistic level” impossible for the audience, but sort of r e l a t i o n s  between 
realistic o r  fantastic elements that violate the norms of everyday life experien­
ce26. Those norms, which are, in fact, synthesizing principles of the spectator’s 
actual world (Wo) can be depicted as: “cultural, epistemological, ethical 
principles ... through which we make sense of our lives ... all the logical truths 
of W0, its physical and psychological laws, including the- laws of cause and 
effect, necessity and possibility, etc” 27. If life-principles in the sense specified 
above are responsible for the synthesizing process of the theatrical performance 
as a global sign, the possible world of that performance can be viewed as 
a representation of WQ. That comes as a consequence of the emphasis put on 
the view of the reality as a matter of r e l a t i o n s  among its constituent parts.
What happens in Witkacy’s theatre is that life-principles do operate there 
on a limited scale, but they are not responsible for the synthesizing process of 
the theatrical performance as a g lo b a l  sign. However, the performance, to 
become an integrated whole, must possess some kind of internal organization, 
but that happens on the level of so-called “formal necessity” 28. The theatrical 
performance in Pure Form is “the whole whose meaning is defined by its purely 
scenic internal construction”, “purely formal complications of sound patterns 
as well as psychological and decorative ones”, it is to be governed by “the logic 
of the form itself of that performance”29.
The concept of form is not explicit and a comprehensive approach to it goes 
beyond the limits of our presentation. Some elementary remarks on the subject 
precede the discussion of Witkacy’s notion: “the logic of the form” in part 2. 
For the purposes of the following argument we find it sufficient to specify our 
use of the expressions like “the purely formal level” and “purely formal 
complications”.
Witkacy defines form as the principle through which complex objects 
and phenomena get united. Unity in Variety and Variety in Unity, com­
prehended as the unity imposed on the variety of elements and the he­
terogeneous character of any entity respectively, are inseparable aspects 
of any existence30. Form, as the unifying principle, conditions being,
23 J. Zeman, “The Esthetic Sign in Peirce’s Semiotics”, Semiotica 19 (1977), pp. 241—258.
26 Jennings discussing the concept of “the grotesque” states that the fact that in fairy-tales
animals talk cannot be called grotesque — as it is conditioned by the conventions of the literary
genre. The grotesque hinges upon transgression of the constitutive principles, i.e. logical norms of 
the reader’s world, cf. L.B. Jennings, The Ludicrous Demon. Aspects o f the Grotesque in German 
Post-Romantic Prose (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 358,359.
27 K. Elam. The Semiotics..., pp. 52, 103, 104.
28 S.I. Witkiewicz, Czysta forma..., p. 79; D.C. Gerould, The Madman..., p. 294.
29 Ibid., pp. 77, 78, 82; 292, 293, 296.
30 S.I. Witkiewicz, Czysta forma..., p. 39.
Le. anything that exists, exists through and because of its form. It seems that 
consistency of a sign is the semiotic equivalent of form: “(consistency belongs to 
every sign so far as it is a sign and, therefore, every sign since it signifies primarily 
that it is a sign, signifies its own consistency”31. However, while each sign 
signifies p r im a r i l y  that it is a sign, to manifest, in a direct way the principle of 
Unity’ in Variety and Variety in Unity is to be the on ly  function of a work of 
art32. In other words, a work of art is defined through its function, that is, as an 
object or phenomenon which signifies exclusively its own unity. That corres­
ponds largely to Dewey’s view, that: “a work of art accentuates its being 
a whole” and “in a distinctively esthetic experience characteristics that are 
subdued in other experiences are dominant: those that are subordinate are 
controlling — namely, the characteristics in virtue of which the experience is an 
integrated complete experience on its own account”33.
In view of the above considerations the “purely formal complications” or 
“the purely formal level of perception” can be related to the distinctively 
esthetic situation when the dominant aspect of a given object or phenomenon 
is its unity, and all other meanings are excluded or subdued.
Theatrical performance in Pure Form becomes, then, consistent only on the 
level that, while following Witkacy, one can call the fo rm a l  one. However, it 
can be presumed that because of the suggestive presence on the stage of the 
elements, agents of Wo there are repeated attempts on the part of the audience 
to establish some kind of order in terms of life-logic. W PF still creates an 
illusion that it can be constituted as a representation of Wo and as such 
launches the operation of life-principles that cannot be, however, carried on 
beyond certain point. It is only when the connections governed by life- 
-principles cannot be established that the purely formal connections become 
the alternative. In other words, the formal relations come to the foreground 
only when the relations constituted by life-principles are not applicable at 
a given moment
The shift to the purely formal level of perception is always a dramatic 
attempt of overcoming the phase of irreversible disjunction equivalent with 
death, ultimate annihilation; therefore it brings an idea of extreme danger, 
which according to Burke always excites de l igh t ,  and as such, is productive of 
the feeling of the sublime.
n
The partial answer to the question about the “sublimation” of the theatrical 
performance is included in the above considerations: life-principles operate
31 CP, 5.313.
32 Cf. S.I. Witkiewicz, Czysta forma..., pp. 39, 42.
33 J. Dewey, Art..., pp. 55, 195.
in the theatrical performance in Pure Form on a limited scale, and as such, they 
are not responsible for the constitution of that performance as a g lo b a l  sign. 
That is a sort of “a negative definition” — the definition based on the 
elimination of some features or processes. What still requires more attention is 
the concept of “the logic of the form”, which seems essential for the 
comprehension of the constitutive processes of Pure Form.
As we have already stated the main difficulty about the concepts like “the 
logic of the form” or “the formal connections” comes from the confusion about 
the term “form” itself.
Traditionally, form is defined as “an arrangement of the constituents”, “the 
contour” or “what is directly given to the senses” 34. The concept of “form” 
usually raises the question about its opposite: matter, substance, content What 
Kant says about the formal or material elements depends upon the level of 
application of the form-matter distinction, namely, if it is the level of 
judgements, cognitions, intuitions or sensations35. However, in each of the four 
applications “the matter or content consists of certain elements and the form is 
the manner in which or the structure in terms of which these elements are 
related to one another”36. “Form is always relating the elements in such a way 
as to give them unity” 37; still, the unity of elements can be static or dynamic. 
Dewey’s “morphological unity in variety, is static, extraneous, superimposed 
upon materials that do not actually share in it”38. Form, in turn, is a dynamic 
organization. It takes time to complete it, there is growth, inception, fulfillment. 
Fulfilling and consummating are “continuous functions, not mere ends located 
in one place only”39. Dewey introduces also the concept of “the esthetic form” 
and defines it through its function: “the esthetic form is when the material is so 
arranged ... that it serves immediately the enrichment of the immediate 
experience”40. That corresponds to a larger assumption that the esthetic, 
implies, in much simplification, the immediate41. Whatever the differences, 
all concepts of form imply ordered relations of constituent parts, based on 
a sort of agreement among them.
To probe hypothetically the constitutive processes of Pure Form, we want 
to consider a possible theatrical situation when a high-pitched sound accom­
panies an act of violence performed against a red-colour background. Peirce
34 W. Tatarkiewicz, A History o f Six Ideas. An Essay in Aesthetics (Warszawa: PWN, 
1980), p. 220.
35 D. W. Crawford, Kant's Esthetics Theory (The University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), p. 98.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 J. Dewey, Art..., p. 117, 161.
35 Cf. ibid., p. 56.
40 Ibid., p. 116.
41 Cf. CP, 2.199; F. Sheriff, The Fate o f Meaning (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1989), p. 84; J. Dewey, Art..., pp. 50, 119, 293.
claims: “we cannot comprehend an agreement of two things except as an 
agreement in some respect”42. The agreement among the signs we discuss can 
be viewed as the agreement in the i n t e n s i t y  of the sound, emotion and colour 
respectively. More exactly, it is the agreement in the intensity of the sensations 
the signs produce, where a “sensation” can denote both an impression upon the 
senses, or a certain emotional quality. Kant, while analysing sensations into 
matter and form states that “the matter of a sensation is its peculiar quality, 
while its fo rm  is its degree of i n t e n s i ty  or magnitude”43. “The logic of the 
form” can be, then, viewed as the relation among q u a l i t i e s  of signs in  their 
intensity. It can be said, then, that while “life-logic depends on the agreement 
of fac t s”, “the logic of the fo rm ” consists in the agreement of qua l i t i e s .
in
That was only a hypothetical insight into the nature of synthesizing 
processes of Pure Form in theatre, which, as a whole, may not undergo 
analysis.
Witkacy draws a parallel between theatre in Pure Form and instrumental 
music, insisting that in theatre we should experience “a metaphysical drama similar 
to the one which takes place among the notes of a symphony and only among 
them”, or that “the actor, in his own right, should not exist ... he should be the 
same kind of part within a whole ... as the note C-sharp in a particular musical 
composition”44. Zeman, discussing Peirce’s categories of Firstness, Secondness and 
Thirdness45, presents the experience one has when enjoying a piece of instrumen­
tal music as a first and as such, unanalysable, since “a difficult thing about talking 
about first is that its firstness when it is grasped as a first, effectively evanesces”46. 
Firstness is a mode of being of what is such as it is without reference to anything 
else47; as a mode of cognition, it can be depicted as immediate consciousness, that 
is “... whatever of consciousness can be immediately given”48, “passive conscious­
ness of quality, without recognition or analysis”49. The immediate, in turn, implies 
the unanalysable, the inexplicable, the unintellectual50.
42 CP, 1551.
43D.W. Crawford, Kant's Esthetic..., pp. 97, 98.
44 S.I. Witkiewicz, Czysta forma..., pp. 77, 81; D. C. Gerould, The Madman..., p. 293, 296.
45 Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, as modes of being can be viewed, in much 
simplification, as categories of possibility, reality and necessity, respectively, as modes of cognition 
— as categories of quality, fact and law (cf. CP. 1.23, 1.378, 1.537, 8.328).
46 J. Zaman, The Esthetic Sign..., p. 243.
47 Cf. CP, 832.
48 CP, 1.310.
49 CP, 1.377.
50 CP, 5189.
Pure Form can be viewed as a first not only on the account of a possibly 
chance convergence of the terms in Witkacy’s and Zeman’s statement. Witkacy 
insists that experience of Pure Form is the im m e d ia te ,  Le. free from any 
ana lys ing ,  comprehensive strategies, perception of the unity of a work 
of a r t31.
What is more, the effect that Pure Form evokes in the audience is to be the 
fee l ing of Unity,in Variety and Variety in Unity. The means that it is the 
e m o t i o n a l  aspect of the global interprétant that gets foregrounded52. That 
aspect of Pure Form, namely, its being a first in terms of Peirce’s semiotics 
creates yet another possibility of relating it to the concept of the sublime.
Burke, contrasting the beautiful and the sublime, as the qualities of objects, 
states: “beauty should not be obscure, the great [Le. the sublime — M.Z.] 
ought to be dark and gloomy ... the sublime objects are vast in their 
dimensions, beautiful ones comparatively small; beauty should be smooth and 
polished, the great rugged and negligent” 53. All those attributes of the sublime 
can be condensed in the statement that the sublime object is beyond grasp, it 
lacks definite contours, evades cognition. For Kant “the sublime is to be found 
in a fo rm less  object” 54, which may sound contradictory55, still, he points out 
that “the totality of the object is present to the t h o u g h t ” 56. The paradox of 
“a formless object” can be solved through a distinction drawn between the 
faculties of a subject: to c once ive  of  something and to “p r e s e n t ” some­
thing57. The imagination may fail to present an object that is present as 
a “concept” to the mind: “we have the Idea of the World (the totality of what it
is), but we do not have the capacity to show an example of it We can
conceive the infinitely great, the infinitely powerful, but every presentation of 
an object destined to “make visible” this absolute greatness or power appears 
to us painfully inadequate” 58.
The point of affinity between Pure Form as unanalysable in its constitutive 
processes and the sublime object as “a formless object”, is, then, indeterminacy
51S.I. Witkiewicz, Czysta forma..., p. 36.
32 In the case of complex signs, while considering their significative effect, one has to realize 
the co-existence of three separate aspects of their interprétant: the emotional, the energetic and the 
logical one (cf. CP, 5.475) and “(t)he functioning of separate interprétants of constituent signs 
within a ... macrosyntagm [a compound — M. Z.] brings about ... the foregrounding ... of the 
interprétants of such composite signs” (W. Kalaga, The Literary Sign. A  THadic Model (Katowice: 
Uniwersytet Śląski Press, 1986), p. 91).
53 E. Burke, A Philosophical Inquiry..., pp. 233, 238.
5i D.W. Crawford, Kant's Esthetic..., p. 99.
55 Ibid., p. 7.
56 Ibid.
-■ 57 Cf. J-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota 
Press, 1984), p 77.
58 Ibid., p. 78.
of their presence that, however strongly felt, can never be reduced to definite 
area in space or time. That quality shows Pure Form and the sublime object as 
overlapping in relation to Peirce’s category of Firstness. Most obviously* that 
parallel between Pure Form and the concept of the sublime requires more 
detailed discussion, which might be only initiated by our remarks.
* * *
The sublime impression consists in distress, uneasiness, it derives its 
pleasure from pain, afflicts with horror, enroots continually the ideas of 
extreme danger. When “art becomes identical with aggression” 59 that happens 
not necessarily through the images of bloodshed, as an act of violence exerted 
upon our senses or sensibility. Art can be aggressive when it is haunted with the 
potential of nothingness, void, affecting not the senses, but the instinct of 
self-preservation itself, and when the phase of reassuring harmony is achieved 
due to the processes which in their very nature are “unanalysable, inexplicable, 
ungraspable”.
59 S. Sontag, Styles o f Radical Will (New York: Delta Publishing Co., Inc., 1970), p. 121.
